On Sun, 25 Aug 2013 16:42:57 -0700 "Christian Huitema" <huit...@huitema.net> wrote: > I studied such systems intensely, and designed some > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_Name_Resolution_Protocol). Using > a distributed hash table securely is really hard. The basic idea of > DHT is that information is spread on the network based on matches > between the hash of a resource identifier and the hash of a node > identifier. All nodes are effectively relying on every other node. > In an open network, that is pretty much equivalent to "relying on > the goodness of strangers." You can be sure that if our buddies at > the NSA set up to watch the content of a DHT, they will succeed.
That is not my worry. Signing the data posted to the DHT can prevent spoofing, querying it over a mix network or using a PIR protocol can prevent eavesdropping. I'm more worried about various sorts of denial of service attacks, or service being shut down by inadvertent behavior. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography