On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 11:03 PM, John Kelsey <crypto....@gmail.com> wrote:
> The backup access problem isn't just a crypto problem, it's a social/legal > problem. There ultimately needs to be some outside mechanism for using > social or legal means to ensure that, say, my kids can get access to at > least some of my encrypted files after I drop dead or land in the hospital > in a coma. Or that I can somehow convince someone that it's really me and > I'd like access to the safe deposit box whose password I forgot and lost my > backup copy of. Or whatever. > > This is complicated by the certainty that if someone has the power to get > access to my encrypted data, they will inevitably be forced to do so by > courts or national security letters, and will also be subject to extralegal > pressures or attacks to make them turn over some keys. I suspect the best > that can be workably done now is to make any key escrow service's key > accesses transparent and impossible to hide from the owner of the key, and > then let users decide what should and shoudn't be escrowed. But this isn't > all that great an answer. > To avoid mandated/coerced release substitute 'keep at bank' with 'bury at undisclosed location'. There is really no 100% reliable way to make things available to your heirs while avoiding government coercion. Particularly since the government issues the documents saying that you are dead. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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