The following is from a similar list in Europe. Think this echoes much on this list but has an interesting twist about PFS cipher suites.
Begin forwarded message: > ________________________________________ > From: Paterson, Kenny [kenny.pater...@rhul.ac.uk] > Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 12:03 AM > To: Christof Paar; ecrypt2-...@esat.kuleuven.be > Subject: Re: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption > > Christof, > > Thanks for sharing this link. > > What seems likely, reading between the lines of this article, is that > NSA/GCHQ have access, by a variety of means, to RSA private keys for > popular websites, enabling them to (at will) recover SSL/TLS session keys. > This can be done offline for stored traffic or online as packets pass by > on the network. I stress that the article does not say this directly. > > One solution, preventing passive attacks, is for major browsers and > websites to switch to using PFS ciphersuites (i.e. those based on > ephemeral Diffie-Hellmann key exchange). For statistics on current > adoption of such ciphersuites, see: > > http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/25/ssl-intercepted-today-decrypte > d-tomorrow.html > > > Regards > > Kenny
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