At 10:39 AM 9/11/2013, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Perfect Forward Secrecy is not perfect. In fact it is no better than regular public key. The only difference is that if the public key system is cracked then with PFS the attacker has to break every single key exchange and not just the keys in the certificates and if you use an RSA outer with an ECC inner then you double the cryptanalytic cost of the attack (theory as well as computation).

I wouldn't mind if it had been called Pretty Good Forward Secrecy instead, but it really is a lot better than regular public key. The main difference is that cracking PFS requires breaking every single key exchange before the attack using cryptanalysis, while cracking the RSA or ECC outer layer can be done by compromising the stored private key, which is far easier to do using subpoenas or malware or rubber hoses than cryptanalysis.

(Of course, any messages that were saved by the sender or recipient can still be cracked by non-cryptanalytic techniques as well, but that's a separate problem.)

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