On 2013-09-10, at 17:35, Ben Laurie <b...@links.org> wrote:

> On 10 September 2013 22:04, Joe Abley <jab...@hopcount.ca> wrote:
>> Suppose Mallory has access to the private keys of CAs which are in "the" 
>> browser list or otherwise widely-trusted.
>> An on-path attack between Alice and Bob would allow Mallory to terminate 
>> Alice's TLS connection, presenting an opportunistically-generated 
>> server-side certificate with signatures that allow it to be trusted by Alice 
>> without pop-ups and warnings. Instantiating a corresponding session with Bob 
>> and ALGing the plaintext through with interception is then straightforward.
> CT makes this impossible to do undetected, of course.

I don't feel qualified to endorse "impossible", but for the armchair crypto 
spectator it does sound very much like the right thing.

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