Phillip Hallam-Baker <> writes:

> I have attempted to produce a summary of the discussion so far for use
> as a requirements document for the PRISM-PROOF email scheme. This is
> now available as an Internet draft.

First, I suggest removing all remotely political commentary and sticking
to technical facts.  Phrases like "questionable constitutional validity"
have no place in an Internet draft and harm the document, in my opinion.

Second, your section on Perfect Forward Secrecy ignores the purpose of
PFS, which has nothing to do with defense against cryptanalytic attacks.
The purpose of PFS is this: Should an attacker compel you to disclose
your private key, or should they compromise or confiscate the system
where your private key is stored, they could then decrypt all of your
earlier communications...  unless you used PFS.

 - Nemo
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