On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 15:46:58 -0500 Nico Williams <n...@cryptonector.com> wrote: > On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 03:17:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > On Thu, 12 Sep 2013 14:53:28 -0500 Nico Williams > > <n...@cryptonector.com> wrote: > > > Traffic analysis can't really be defeated, not in detail. > > > > What's wrong with mix networks? > > First: you can probably be observed using them.
Sure, but the plan I described a few weeks ago would presumably end with hundreds of thousands or millions of users if it worked at all. > Second: I suspect that to be most effective the mix network also > has to be most inconvenient (high latency, for example). Sure, that's true for voice and such. However, for messaging apps, that's not an issue. See my claims here: http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2013-August/016874.html (That was part of a three message sequence that began with these two: http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2013-August/016870.html and http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2013-August/016872.html but only the second of those two is really relevant to this particular discussion.) > Third: the mix network had better cross multiple jurisdictions that > are not accustomed to cooperating with each other. This seems very > difficult to arrange. That's important for onion networks, not mix networks. I understand that the distinction isn't well understood by most, but it can be summarized thus: an onion network depends on no one observing the whole network to provide security, while a mix network uses sufficient cover traffic and delay induction to prevent people from being able to learn much even if they can observe the whole network and control a minority of nodes. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography