On Jan 27, 2011, at 8:37 45AM, Len Sassaman wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Jan 2011, Thierry Moreau wrote:
>
>> 2) a host plus some H/W for true random source
>
> Speaking of hardware entropy sources, has anyone analyzed the Simtek
> Electronics Entropy Key (http://www.entropykey.co.uk/)? It's a USB dongle,
> recommended to me by several remailer operators. To quote the web site:
>
> "The Entropy Key contains two high-quality noise generators, and an ARM
> Cortex CPU that actively measures, checks and confirms all generated random
> numbers, before encrypting them and sending them to the server. It also
> actively detects attempts to corrupt or sway the device. It aims towards
> FIPS-140-2 Level 3 compliance with some elements of Level 4, including
> tamper-evidence, tamper-proofing, role-based authentication, and
> environmental attacks. If it detects that one of its two generators has
> failed, may be about to fail, or if it detects a physical attack, it will
> automatically shut down."
>
> I have to wonder how it is 2010 and this sort of hardware isn't a standard
> motherboard component, but if the Entropy Key dongle is sound, it's an
> affordable solution to this problem.
>
Because every time someone ships such a device, people on this list and their
colleagues start screaming that (a) you can never tell if it's working
correctly; (b) it's closed hardware so that you don't know what it *really*
does; (c) that it's actually an NSA plot to start with. All the while, of
course, they're ignoring that you can, at the least, mix in as an additional
source of randomness, assuming you have good mixer -- and if you don't, your
other sources of randomness aren't being used properly, either.
Yes, my cynicism is showing today.
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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