On 18/09/11 09:12, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
If you can secure the system from the government...
> I can't possibly be the only one here that takes the following to be axiomatic: +++ A communication security system, which depends on a corporate entity playing a role of a ~trusted-third-party~, can not be made secure against a government in whose jurisdiction that trusted-third-party operates. +++ On the other hand, a perfectly adequate low-level retail transaction security system can best be achieved by using a trusted-third-party, SSL-like system. It follows then that we are not looking at replacing the SSL system with something better, but at keeping the current SSL - perhaps with some incremental improvements - for the retail transactions, and designing a new system, from the ground up, based on some a-priory, contemporary and well documented threat model. This new system should address those applications which have spilled outside of the (implied?) threat model on which the SSL design was based. That new threat model must not fail to explicitly state just who are the attackers are and what their capabilities and motivations must be considered. Mark R. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
