My suggestion is that you research the history of (cryptographic) authentication, mutual authentication (thanks Wikipedia for that phrase) and MITM. (Maybe you already have done that, though?)
I can at least point out that spy agencies have known for many many decades that you can not securely and secretly communicate with anybody else without preparing it in advance. In some way or another, a secret of some sort must be shared with the intended recipient and only with him. (This has been discussed in the comments on Schneier's blog, for example.) If there is no unique knowledge that only your recipient has, you can't send a message that *only* he can understand. To what extent/how thoroughly do you need this to be proven in the kind of documents you're looking for? 2013/6/6 Ralph Holz <[email protected]> > Hi, > > I am currently doing a write-up that dives into some of the more formal > aspects of authentication. In particular, I am wondering when exactly it > was formally proved that two entities A and B cannot establish a secure > channel between them without such a secure channel having been available > to them at a previous point in time. Or, in other words, you cannot > authenticate without already having authenticated credentials for that > purpose. > > To the best of my knowledge, the earliest such proof is the one by Colin > Boyd: > > Colin Boyd. Security architecture using formal methods. IEEE Journal on > Selected Topics in Communications. 1993. > > Does anyone know of an earlier such (formal) proof? > > Ralph > > -- > Ralph Holz > I8 - Network Architectures and Services > Technische Universität München > http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ > Phone +49.89.289.18043 > PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography >
_______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
