On 15/06/2014 14:37 pm, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > I've no public opinion on Certicom's patent practices. And the > behaviour of the signals intelligence agencies has been IMO > deplorable. So I sympathise with some of what you are saying. > However, building your case on bogus claims that are not facts > as you are pearly doing is a really bad idea. In particular... > > On 15/06/14 14:13, ianG wrote: >> What is also curious is that Dan >> Brown is highly active in the IETF working groups for crypto, > > That is not correct as far as I can see. In my local archives, > I see one email from him to the TLS list in 2011 and none in > 2012. For the security area list (saag), I see a smattering > of mails in 2011 and 2012 and none in 2013. For the IRTF's > CFRG, I see a few in 2010, none in 2011 and some in 2012 and > 2013. I do see increased participation over the last year on > the the DUAL-EC topic. > > None of the above is anywhere near "highly active" which is > therefore simply false. > > And I don't believe you yourself are sufficiently active to > judge whether or not someone else is "highly active" in the > IETF to be honest. Nor do you seem to have gone through the > mail list archives to check.
For my part, I had seen his name only with respect to IETF WGs. However I admit that I do not follow IETF security WGs closely, so am not qualified to assert "highly active." You are right, I am wrong. > You are both of course welcome to become highly active if you > do want to participate, same as anyone else. > >> adding >> weight to the claim that the IETF security area is corrupted. > > And that supposed conclusion, based only on an incorrect claim, > is utter nonsense. I would have expected better logic and closer > adherence to the facts. > > Yes, the IETF security area needs to do better, and quite a few > folks are working on that. Yes, its almost certain the someone > was paid by BULLRUN to muck up IETF work. Nonetheless unfounded > misstatements such as the above don't help and are wrong. And > the correct reaction is to do better work and not to fall for > the same guily-by-association fallacy that the leads the spooks > to think that pervasive monitoring is a good plan. I had a long post addressing this issue, but as it takes us further from the subject at hand, I'll pull my head from out of the rabbit hole. iang _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
