> I developed a different approach, which I call Linux Random Number Generator > (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux kernel. The main improvements > compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide sufficient entropy during > boot > time as well as in virtual environments and when using SSDs.
After reading the paper, it is not clear to me how this goal is achieved. As far as I can see, no new sources of entropy are introduced; in fact a point is made to use only interrupt timings, arguing that these effectively include other events. Why does this design make more entropy available during boot and with solid-state storage? I'm also having trouble telling at a glance the exact blocking behavior of the interfaces proposed. It seems that /dev/random and getrandom() will block when the estimated entropy in the "seed buffer" is below some threshold. But numbers mentioned are 32, 112, and 256; which is it and when? About /dev/urandom it says that reseeds are required periodically. Are these subject to blocking? -SMH _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
