Thor Lancelot Simon <t...@panix.com> on Wed, Apr 27 2016: > So we eat things like the first several seconds of frames from > the network; dmesg output; TOD; IP addresses; hostnames; and other > configuration and nonsecret data [...]
Nice. I think this highlights how a hang-up on entropy estimation has a chilling effect. Sources that cannot be reliably estimated to provide "true randomness" are discounted and end up unused. I would strongly favor a dragnet approach that focuses on catching every (possible) bit of entropy and considers the very first boot without a saved seed (where estimation matters) a special case. How much entropy does the NetBSD design credit those "soft sources"? -SMH _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
