On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 10:19 AM, Sven M. Hallberg <pe...@khjk.org> wrote: > Thor Lancelot Simon <t...@panix.com> on Wed, Apr 27 2016: >> So we eat things like the first several seconds of frames from >> the network; dmesg output; TOD; IP addresses; hostnames; and other >> configuration and nonsecret data [...] > > Nice. I think this highlights how a hang-up on entropy estimation has a > chilling effect. Sources that cannot be reliably estimated to provide > "true randomness" are discounted and end up unused. > > I would strongly favor a dragnet approach that focuses on catching every > (possible) bit of entropy and considers the very first boot without a > saved seed (where estimation matters) a special case. > > How much entropy does the NetBSD design credit those "soft sources"?
If only there was an asymptotically good design that didn't require any estimation at all. See https://www.schneier.com/cryptography/fortuna/ for details. > > > -SMH > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
