Hello,

I improvised a clamav signature file that looks for compromised eMudhra
and Comodo CA certificates: you can find it attached to this email.

I generated it by using bits of the PEM base64 data, the binary modulus
or public keys of the certificates, and binary data as found in
https://sources.debian.org/src/kodi/2:21.3+dfsg-2/lib/libUPnP/Neptune/Source/Data/TLS/Base/NptTlsTrustAnchor_Base_0065.cpp

You can try it out on your own system with something like this:

  [sudo] clamscan -r -i -d cacerts.ldb /usr /var/lib/ ~/.local/ ~/.cache/

Besides containers, flatpaks, virtualenvs, nspawn machines and other
things that embed entire OS trees or vendored libraries that are not
being kept up to date, this, on my Debian systems, finds positives in
several system packages:

  # python3-pip-whl:
  /usr/share/python-wheels/pip-25.1.1-py3-none-any.whl: 
Debian.Certs.eMudhraPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # libgrpc29t64:
  /usr/share/grpc/roots.pem: Debian.Certs.eMudhraPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # texlive-base:
  /usr/share/texlive/tlpkg/installer/curl/curl-ca-bundle.crt: 
Debian.Certs.ComodoPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # libnode115:
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libnode.so.115: 
Debian.Certs.eMudhraPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # libnss3:
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libnssckbi.so: 
Debian.Certs.ComodoKDEBIN.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # python3-pip:
  /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/pip/_vendor/certifi/cacert.pem: 
Debian.Certs.eMudhraPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # python3-botocore:
  /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/botocore/cacert.pem: 
Debian.Certs.ComodoPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # awscli:
  /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/awscli/botocore/cacert.pem: 
Debian.Certs.ComodoPEM.0.UNOFFICIAL FOUND

  # libqt6webenginecore6-bin:
  /usr/lib/qt6/libexec/webenginedriver: Debian.Certs.eMudhraDER.0.UNOFFICIAL 
FOUND

Note: these results are limited to things I happen to have installed in
my system.

This feels a lot bigger than I can handle, and I'm not sure what could
be a next step.

A possible thing that could be done is to write a lintian plugin that
warns if a package is embedding these keys: I offer the attached
signature file as a base for that.

Note that clamav is able to open archives, which may help finding the
cert in things like pip-25.1.1-py3-none-any.whl.

Can one write a lintian test that uses clamav if installed? It could be
interesting, also to scan using the standard clamav database for things
that may have slipped into packages for some reason.

Another possible thing we can do is run clamav on the unpacked contents
of the archive every once in a while: is there a place where this can
easily be done?

I understand that I am unable to tell if these certificates are only
shipped, or also used. Perhaps removing them is an easier route than
ensuring that they are not, and keep not, being used?


Enrico

-- 
GPG key: 4096R/634F4BD1E7AD5568 2009-05-08 Enrico Zini <[email protected]>
# eMudra:
# Extract from the PEM key data
Debian.Certs.eMudhraPEM.0;Engine:81-255,Target:0;0;546a45544d4245474131554543784d4b5a573154615764754946424c5354456c4d434d474131554543684d635a5531315a476879595342555a574e6f626d3973
# binary pub part of the CA key
Debian.Certs.eMudhraDER.0;Engine:81-255,Target:0;0;0423a50cb82d12f528f3b1b2dde20212809e395f494d9fc925345974ecbb061ce7c072afe8ae2fe141548714a84ab2e87c82e65b6ab5dcb375ce8b06d08623bf46d58e0f3f04f4d71c927ef6a563c2f55f8e2e4fa11819022b320a82647d1693d1
# Comodo:
# Extract from the PEM key data
Debian.Certs.ComodoPEM.0;Engine:81-255,Target:0;0;657a364b4a636641335a336d4e576751494a3250324e3753773453634456376f4c386b434177454141614f42774443427654416442674e564851344546675155
# Comodo binary data from 
libupnp/neptune/source/data/tls/base/npttlstrustanchor_base_0065.cpp
Debian.Certs.ComodoKDEBIN.0;Engine:81-255,Target:0;0;308204323082031aa003020102020101300d06092a864886f70d0101050500307b310b3009060355040613024742311b301906035504080c1247726561746572204d616e636865737465723110300e06035504070c0753616c666f7264311a3018060355040a0c11436f6d6f646f204341204c696d697465643121301f06035504030c18414141204365727469666963617465205365727669636573301e170d3034303130313030303030305a170d3238313233313233353935395a307b310b3009060355040613
# Binary modulus part from the DER data
Debian.Certs.ComodoDER.0;Engine:81-255,Target:0;0;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

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: PGP signature

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