Marco d'Itri wrote:
> I agree: we need a new policy saying that applications MUST use the
> system certificate store.

Applications should never embed an *entire* certificate store for
talking to arbitrary URLs. However, applications should be able to embed
a *single* CA if they're talking to a single well-known service,
maintained by upstream, that is known to exclusively use certificates
from a single CA.

Consider how many issues like the eMudhra one could have been prevented
by packages that only talk to a single service and can reasonably say
"this service will never, ever use a certificate that doesn't chain up
to Let's Encrypt".

(Note that I'm not talking about certificate pinning, which has a whole
pile of problems. I'm talking about *CA* pinning, which largely
doesn't; it just prevents a class of MITM attacks.)

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