On 11/16/26 6:27 AM, Josh Triplett wrote:
Marco d'Itri wrote:
I agree: we need a new policy saying that applications MUST use the
system certificate store.
Applications should never embed an *entire* certificate store for
talking to arbitrary URLs. However, applications should be able to embed
a *single* CA if they're talking to a single well-known service,
maintained by upstream, that is known to exclusively use certificates
from a single CA.
Consider how many issues like the eMudhra one could have been prevented
by packages that only talk to a single service and can reasonably say
"this service will never, ever use a certificate that doesn't chain up
to Let's Encrypt".
(Note that I'm not talking about certificate pinning, which has a whole
pile of problems. I'm talking about *CA* pinning, which largely
doesn't; it just prevents a class of MITM attacks.)
Sort of. Until that CA needs replacing[1] and you also need to rush to
replace the cert store. In the end we should allow administrators to
implement agility and not hardcode.
That being said, if something is not web it probably should not use the
WebPKI.
Kind regards
Philipp Kern
[1] No-one should be "too big to fail".