Hi,
I claimed it yesterday and my work is mostly done.
Cheers!
Sylvain
On 15/05/2021 23:11, Ola Lundqvist wrote:
Hi Utkarsh
I have looked into your patch and I think it looks good. I do not fully
understand why all the changes in url.c were done but I think it looks
fine anyway.
The risk of regression should be small.
Do you want me to do the update, or do you want to do it yourself?
Or do you think we should ignore it?
Best regards
// Ola
On Thu, 8 Apr 2021 at 22:33, Ola Lundqvist <o...@inguza.com
<mailto:o...@inguza.com>> wrote:
Hi Utkarsh, all
I have done some more investigation on this matter. I have checked
the statement from upstream that we can re-use some existing strip
code to remove the strings this way.
The thing is that I cannot find any code that do URL stripping so
that is not really a viable option. This leaves only the two options
you have already stated.
Either we ignore, or we port the entire URL API.
I think the risk of regression is rather small if we port it,
because this is only used in this place. Assuming there is no name
clash introduced.
So what do you all think? Ignore or fix?
There are good arguments for both.
Ignore is ok because this only happens with a specific command line
option, and even if used the risk of problem is quite small.
On the other hand curl is a very common tool which means that it
could be worth fixing even small issues.
I think both are ok.
Best regards
// Ola
On Wed, 7 Apr 2021 at 23:07, Ola Lundqvist <o...@inguza.com
<mailto:o...@inguza.com>> wrote:
Hi Utkarsh, all
After reading the description of this CVE again I realize that I
misunderstood the description last time.
The problem is that the "referrer" header is not stripped.
This changes my conclusion to some extent.
I see no problem with fixing this issue from a regression point
of view (apart from what has already been expressed).
The amount of services that rely on the referrer field should be
small, if any.
I still think we can ignore it though with the same reasoing as
I expressed in the last email. The problem should be minor.
There are other worse problem by providing sensitive data in the
URL.
And again if the attacker can make a redirect, the attacker can
most likely get the URL anyway so then nothing has leaked.
Cheers
// Ola
// Ola
On Wed, 7 Apr 2021 at 13:19, Ola Lundqvist <o...@inguza.com
<mailto:o...@inguza.com>> wrote:
Hi Utkarsh, all
Is this even a vulnerability?
The problem is that authentication information is not
stripped if the browser is redirected to another place.
If you trust a site enough to provide authentication data, I
guess you also trust that if that site happens to be
relocated you should also trust the new place.
I mean if the attacker has the power to redirect I expect
that it has the power to read the authentication data
anyway. There could be cases when this is not the case, but
in general it should not be possible for the attacker to
redirect without also having more power.
We could of course consider to apply this fix, but it
certainly will cause a regression since my expectation is
that authentication information is forwarded.
I think it should be ignored. If we fix it, it should be
with a configuration option, but I think that is a
little too intrusive for (E)LTS.
Or have I missed something?
Best regards
// Ola
On Mon, 5 Apr 2021 at 02:20, Utkarsh Gupta
<utka...@debian.org <mailto:utka...@debian.org>> wrote:
Hello,
[CCing the Security team in case they have some ideas or
suggestions
for CVE-2021-22876/curl]
Whilst triaging and looking thoroughly for this CVE,
affecting curl, I
noticed that the upstream patch uses elements like CURLU,
CURLUPART_{URL,FRAGMENT,USER,PASSWORD}. This comes from
the URL API
which seems to be missing in both, stretch and jessie.
There seem to be two plausible options at this point:
1. Given that this CVE has been assigned low severity by
upstream, we
could perhaps mark this as no-dsa or ignored, with an
appropriate
comment; or
2. Backport the entire URL API (patch for that is
attached; is
intrusive) and then apply the fix for CVE-2021-22876
(patch attached)
on top of that. Whilst this option makes sense, but
backporting the
entire URL API could have an unforeseen effect (or
chances of
potential regressions) and in any case, looks somewhat
intrusive.
So for now, I've added curl to dla-needed and ela-needed
but if we
decide to mark this as no-dsa or ignored, we could
simply drop this
from there as this is the only CVE that needs working on.
Let me know what y'all think.
- u
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