Hi Sylvain

Great! Let me know if you want help with review, testing or something else.

// Ola

On Sat, 15 May 2021 at 23:18, Sylvain Beucler <b...@beuc.net> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I claimed it yesterday and my work is mostly done.
>
> Cheers!
> Sylvain
>
> On 15/05/2021 23:11, Ola Lundqvist wrote:
> > Hi Utkarsh
> >
> > I have looked into your patch and I think it looks good. I do not fully
> > understand why all the changes in url.c were done but I think it looks
> > fine anyway.
> > The risk of regression should be small.
> >
> > Do you want me to do the update, or do you want to do it yourself?
> > Or do you think we should ignore it?
> >
> > Best regards
> >
> > // Ola
> >
> > On Thu, 8 Apr 2021 at 22:33, Ola Lundqvist <o...@inguza.com
> > <mailto:o...@inguza.com>> wrote:
> >
> >     Hi Utkarsh, all
> >
> >     I have done some more investigation on this matter. I have checked
> >     the statement from upstream that we can re-use some existing strip
> >     code to remove the strings this way.
> >     The thing is that I cannot find any code that do URL stripping so
> >     that is not really a viable option. This leaves only the two options
> >     you have already stated.
> >
> >     Either we ignore, or we port the entire URL API.
> >
> >     I think the risk of regression is rather small if we port it,
> >     because this is only used in this place. Assuming there is no name
> >     clash introduced.
> >
> >     So what do you all think? Ignore or fix?
> >     There are good arguments for both.
> >
> >     Ignore is ok because this only happens with a specific command line
> >     option, and even if used the risk of problem is quite small.
> >
> >     On the other hand curl is a very common tool which means that it
> >     could be worth fixing even small issues.
> >
> >     I think both are ok.
> >
> >     Best regards
> >
> >     // Ola
> >
> >     On Wed, 7 Apr 2021 at 23:07, Ola Lundqvist <o...@inguza.com
> >     <mailto:o...@inguza.com>> wrote:
> >
> >         Hi Utkarsh, all
> >
> >         After reading the description of this CVE again I realize that I
> >         misunderstood the description last time.
> >
> >         The problem is that the "referrer" header is not stripped.
> >
> >         This changes my conclusion to some extent.
> >
> >         I see no problem with fixing this issue from a regression point
> >         of view (apart from what has already been expressed).
> >         The amount of services that rely on the referrer field should be
> >         small, if any.
> >
> >         I still think we can ignore it though with the same reasoing as
> >         I expressed in the last email. The problem should be minor.
> >         There are other worse problem by providing sensitive data in the
> >         URL.
> >         And again if the attacker can make a redirect, the attacker can
> >         most likely get the URL anyway so then nothing has leaked.
> >
> >         Cheers
> >
> >         // Ola
> >
> >
> >         // Ola
> >
> >         On Wed, 7 Apr 2021 at 13:19, Ola Lundqvist <o...@inguza.com
> >         <mailto:o...@inguza.com>> wrote:
> >
> >             Hi Utkarsh, all
> >
> >             Is this even a vulnerability?
> >             The problem is that authentication information is not
> >             stripped if the browser is redirected to another place.
> >
> >             If you trust a site enough to provide authentication data, I
> >             guess you also trust that if that site happens to be
> >             relocated you should also trust the new place.
> >             I mean if the attacker has the power to redirect I expect
> >             that it has the power to read the authentication data
> >             anyway. There could be cases when this is not the case, but
> >             in general it should not be possible for the attacker to
> >             redirect without also having more power.
> >
> >             We could of course consider to apply this fix, but it
> >             certainly will cause a regression since my expectation is
> >             that authentication information is forwarded.
> >
> >             I think it should be ignored. If we fix it, it should be
> >             with a configuration option, but I think that is a
> >             little too intrusive for (E)LTS.
> >
> >             Or have I missed something?
> >
> >             Best regards
> >
> >             // Ola
> >
> >             On Mon, 5 Apr 2021 at 02:20, Utkarsh Gupta
> >             <utka...@debian.org <mailto:utka...@debian.org>> wrote:
> >
> >                 Hello,
> >
> >                 [CCing the Security team in case they have some ideas or
> >                 suggestions
> >                 for CVE-2021-22876/curl]
> >
> >                 Whilst triaging and looking thoroughly for this CVE,
> >                 affecting curl, I
> >                 noticed that the upstream patch uses elements like CURLU,
> >                 CURLUPART_{URL,FRAGMENT,USER,PASSWORD}. This comes from
> >                 the URL API
> >                 which seems to be missing in both, stretch and jessie.
> >
> >                 There seem to be two plausible options at this point:
> >
> >                 1. Given that this CVE has been assigned low severity by
> >                 upstream, we
> >                 could perhaps mark this as no-dsa or ignored, with an
> >                 appropriate
> >                 comment; or
> >
> >                 2. Backport the entire URL API (patch for that is
> >                 attached; is
> >                 intrusive) and then apply the fix for CVE-2021-22876
> >                 (patch attached)
> >                 on top of that. Whilst this option makes sense, but
> >                 backporting the
> >                 entire URL API could have an unforeseen effect (or
> >                 chances of
> >                 potential regressions) and in any case, looks somewhat
> >                 intrusive.
> >
> >                 So for now, I've added curl to dla-needed and ela-needed
> >                 but if we
> >                 decide to mark this as no-dsa or ignored, we could
> >                 simply drop this
> >                 from there as this is the only CVE that needs working on.
> >
> >                 Let me know what y'all think.
> >
> >
> >                 - u
> >
> >
> >
> >             --
> >               --- Inguza Technology AB --- MSc in Information Technology
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 --- Inguza Technology AB --- MSc in Information Technology ----
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