Hi Ola,
You can check the LTS version at:
https://www.beuc.net/tmp/debian-lts/curl/
I followed the method from Ubuntu and SUSE and backported the URL API
for LTS and ELTS, plus the new test case for the CVE.
I'm currently diffing the test suite results, cf. my notes at:
https://wiki.debian.org/LTS/TestSuites/curl
Cheers!
Sylvain
On 15/05/2021 23:22, Ola Lundqvist wrote:
Hi Sylvain
Great! Let me know if you want help with review, testing or something else.
// Ola
On Sat, 15 May 2021 at 23:18, Sylvain Beucler <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi,
I claimed it yesterday and my work is mostly done.
Cheers!
Sylvain
On 15/05/2021 23:11, Ola Lundqvist wrote:
> Hi Utkarsh
>
> I have looked into your patch and I think it looks good. I do not
fully
> understand why all the changes in url.c were done but I think it
looks
> fine anyway.
> The risk of regression should be small.
>
> Do you want me to do the update, or do you want to do it yourself?
> Or do you think we should ignore it?
>
> Best regards
>
> // Ola
>
> On Thu, 8 Apr 2021 at 22:33, Ola Lundqvist <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>
> Hi Utkarsh, all
>
> I have done some more investigation on this matter. I have
checked
> the statement from upstream that we can re-use some existing
strip
> code to remove the strings this way.
> The thing is that I cannot find any code that do URL stripping so
> that is not really a viable option. This leaves only the two
options
> you have already stated.
>
> Either we ignore, or we port the entire URL API.
>
> I think the risk of regression is rather small if we port it,
> because this is only used in this place. Assuming there is no
name
> clash introduced.
>
> So what do you all think? Ignore or fix?
> There are good arguments for both.
>
> Ignore is ok because this only happens with a specific
command line
> option, and even if used the risk of problem is quite small.
>
> On the other hand curl is a very common tool which means that it
> could be worth fixing even small issues.
>
> I think both are ok.
>
> Best regards
>
> // Ola
>
> On Wed, 7 Apr 2021 at 23:07, Ola Lundqvist <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>
> Hi Utkarsh, all
>
> After reading the description of this CVE again I realize
that I
> misunderstood the description last time.
>
> The problem is that the "referrer" header is not stripped.
>
> This changes my conclusion to some extent.
>
> I see no problem with fixing this issue from a regression
point
> of view (apart from what has already been expressed).
> The amount of services that rely on the referrer field
should be
> small, if any.
>
> I still think we can ignore it though with the
same reasoing as
> I expressed in the last email. The problem should be minor.
> There are other worse problem by providing sensitive data
in the
> URL.
> And again if the attacker can make a redirect, the
attacker can
> most likely get the URL anyway so then nothing has leaked.
>
> Cheers
>
> // Ola
>
>
> // Ola
>
> On Wed, 7 Apr 2021 at 13:19, Ola Lundqvist
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>
> Hi Utkarsh, all
>
> Is this even a vulnerability?
> The problem is that authentication information is not
> stripped if the browser is redirected to another place.
>
> If you trust a site enough to provide authentication
data, I
> guess you also trust that if that site happens to be
> relocated you should also trust the new place.
> I mean if the attacker has the power to redirect I expect
> that it has the power to read the authentication data
> anyway. There could be cases when this is not the
case, but
> in general it should not be possible for the attacker to
> redirect without also having more power.
>
> We could of course consider to apply this fix, but it
> certainly will cause a regression since my expectation is
> that authentication information is forwarded.
>
> I think it should be ignored. If we fix it, it should be
> with a configuration option, but I think that is a
> little too intrusive for (E)LTS.
>
> Or have I missed something?
>
> Best regards
>
> // Ola
>
> On Mon, 5 Apr 2021 at 02:20, Utkarsh Gupta
> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
<mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> [CCing the Security team in case they have some
ideas or
> suggestions
> for CVE-2021-22876/curl]
>
> Whilst triaging and looking thoroughly for this CVE,
> affecting curl, I
> noticed that the upstream patch uses elements
like CURLU,
> CURLUPART_{URL,FRAGMENT,USER,PASSWORD}. This
comes from
> the URL API
> which seems to be missing in both, stretch and
jessie.
>
> There seem to be two plausible options at this point:
>
> 1. Given that this CVE has been assigned low
severity by
> upstream, we
> could perhaps mark this as no-dsa or ignored, with an
> appropriate
> comment; or
>
> 2. Backport the entire URL API (patch for that is
> attached; is
> intrusive) and then apply the fix for CVE-2021-22876
> (patch attached)
> on top of that. Whilst this option makes sense, but
> backporting the
> entire URL API could have an unforeseen effect (or
> chances of
> potential regressions) and in any case, looks
somewhat
> intrusive.
>
> So for now, I've added curl to dla-needed and
ela-needed
> but if we
> decide to mark this as no-dsa or ignored, we could
> simply drop this
> from there as this is the only CVE that needs
working on.
>
> Let me know what y'all think.
