On Thu, Dec 23, 2021, 16:27 Jeremy Ardley <jer...@ardley.org> wrote: > > On 24/12/21 5:03 am, Curt wrote: > > > > It wasn't really that "rhetorical" a van because it was precisely the > > very concrete "mobile FBI van" described on the Wikipedia page the OP > > referenced. > > > > As for the accurate representation of reality, I'm afraid we can only > > hope, however vainly, that people are capable of determining for > > themselves who might or might not be an expert in the field. > > > >> > https://theintercept.com/document/2015/12/17/government-cellphone-surveillance-catalogue/ > >> > > > The tools listed in the intercept article don't allow interception of > actual voice calls. They are intended to perform traffic analysis and > test functions. > > Any competent authority would simply get a warrant (or not) and > intercept calls at the exchanges. It's very easy and happens all the > time. In conflict countries like Syria and Ukraine you can be certain > that 100% of call metadata are recorded and a significant fraction, if > not 100%, of voice data recorded for future use. It's not a lot of data > on the scale of things. > > Getting back to the OP, on the scale of likelihood: > > - zero probability a bad guy was sitting across the street to intercept > his phone > > - zero probability a carrier exchange was compromised by a non-state actor > > - moderate probability the financial institution PBX was compromised > > - good probability the OP computer *could* have been compromised - it's > relatively easy but may not have happened > > My working theory is the financial institution PBX was compromised and a > small percentage of inbound calls intercepted. It was the OP's bad luck > to be one of those. > > -- > Jeremy >
> Thank you.
