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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12561090#action_12561090
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Rick Hillegas commented on DERBY-2109:
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>> Those arguments are case sensitive, so it is up to the UserAuthenticator to
>> determine the rules it wants to enforce.
>
>But is such a class honouring the UserAuthenticator api when it does that? The
>description for authenticateUser states that an unquoted user name is treated
>as a "case-insensitive authorization i>dentifier" by Derby's authorization
>system. While this is technically incorrect, (see DERBY-3334), the intention
>behind the text is to follow SQL identifier rules for converting the parameter
>userName to a >unique authorization identifier within Derby. This can be seen
>by the fact this mapping will be followed:
The javadoc for UserAuthenticator states the rules for mapping the userName
onto the value of SYSSCHEMAS.AUTHORIZATIONID. Indirectly, it warns the customer
that Edward and EdWard will be thrown into the same schema even though the
company-wide authentication service recognizes these two names as different
individuals with different credentials. However, the javadoc should probably
punch up the significance of this behavior.
In the Developer's Guide section titled "Example of setting a user-defined
class", the sampe code shows a user-supplied authenticator which treats
userName as a case-sensitive string. In that example, Edward and EdWard have
separate credentials.
At least as far as I can see, the surrounding sections of the Developer's Guide
do not explain that Edward and EdWard will be thrown into the same schema.
Probably, we should state this explicitly.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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