On 12/5/2013 7:29 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> 
> On 12/3/2013 3:29 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:
>> I can't think of any reason why a CA would need to back-date an 
>> _end-entity_ certificate.  So by all means list this as a potentially 
>> problematic practice.
> 
> At Amazon, we recently had a situation where we needed to get an end 
> entity certificate based dated to 2012.When we replaced a certificate on 
> a publicly facing server, certain functions on a consumer electronics 
> device stopped working.After debugging we found out that the device in 
> question does not have an internal time and date reference.When the 
> device initializes communication with our servers it first makes a call 
> using HTTP over TLS to get the current date.It then uses this value to 
> set the time for the current session duration.On this initial call, the 
> certificate chain returned by the server is validated using the system 
> default date of January 1, 2012.This means that a certificate issued in 
> 2013 is seen as being in the future and is not accepted by the client on 
> the device.We had to work with a CA to get a back-dated certificate on 
> renewal to allow this device to continue to function as expected.
> 
> I think that it is reasonable to consider back-dating a Problematic 
> Practice, but it is something that should be allowed for specific use 
> cases.As long as we have embedded devices out there, we will run into 
> corner cases requiring some gymnastics to keep things working.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Peter
> 
> 

You have a very buggy "consumer electronics device" that should be
replaced by the manufacturer.  If this is a product Amazon is selling,
Amazon should stop selling it and offer refunds to all customers who
return it.


-- 
David E. Ross
<http://www.rossde.com/>

Where does your elected official stand?  Which
politicians refuse to tell us where they stand?
See the non-partisan Project Vote Smart at
<http://votesmart.org/>.
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