Hello, Am 04/23/2014 05:51 PM, schrieb Eddy Nigg: > On 04/10/2014 07:05 PM, Eddy Nigg wrote: >> I agree - I've saw the tweets bug reports and this posting. I'll be glad >> to join the discussion and we intend to take a public stance as soon as >> things calm down a bit. >> >> Currently all hell is lose, but I promise to get back to you all in due >> time and will explain our position, policy and practices and also refute >> some of the claims that were made. >> >> In the meantime please be patient, thanks. >> > > > Alright - things have calmed down luckily by now. As my first input to > the discussion please read carefully my explanation, thoughts and > comments I've written down in my blog at https://blog.startcom.org/?p=230
thanks for explaining your reasons, but I don't agree on your position in two major points. You say: "The majority understands and cooperate fully, but there are those that cry foul. Unjustified though, because StartCom has clearly disclosed this fact at its web sites and policies and has never hidden it." What's your argument here? Is "crying foul" "Unjustified", because nobody "cried foul" the moment you published your policies? Please consider: Heartbleed-scale problems have hardly happened before. I'ven't considered any mass-key-compromise scenarios before [1] - Looking at the state of OSCP out there, I might not be the only one. Personally, I am "crying foul" because I'm re-thinking your policies having heartbleed in mind. Is this unjustified? I don't think so. But arguing it is, because I could have done this earlier is not constructive. The crucial part is - imho: Is StartSSL still trustworthy while having these policies? - aka: Does it comply with the mozilla ones? Personally, I vote no. StartSSL is not revoking certificates assumed to be compromised, if a subscriber doesn't pay. IMHO it boils down this question: What is the likelihood and impact of encountering compromised, non-revoked StartSSL-certificates? -> You say it is small / low by describing the circumstances under which it happens and causes an impact. -> Others disagree, going safety first. "(...) private keys should be considered as compromised and regenerated as soon as possible." [2] I respect your / StartSSLs opinion, but vote for safety first. IMHO "safety first" is an important property of a trustworthy CA. However, it's not up to me to decided whether StartSSL is still "ok" to be shipped with mozilla. I hope to see an official statement of mozilla, soon. Greetz, Jan P.S. (i) I really hope, that you change your mind by doing revocations for free and charge for re-keying. This will break the issuing-revocation-cycle, too, while going safety first. (ii) I strongly don't agree with that point: "For private sites that are usually not visited by the public (administrative panels for example), changing the host name, deleting the previous DNS entry, obtaining a new certificate and never visit the original site again might work too. Many of the free Class 1 level certificates are used for such purpose." The point is: After key-leakage mitm attacks are possible. Think of an insider being in a encrypted Wifi network. Having "valid" cert for an unused subdomain can do harm ... [1] "Debian-randomness" is the only think, I can remember, but it was smaller, afaik. [2] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2014/msg00071.html _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
