On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 04:35:18PM +0100, Jakob Bohm wrote: > Redacted CT records that tell the world that "there is this single > certificate with this full TBS hash and these technical extensions > issued to some name domain/e-mail under example.com, but it is not > public which specific name/e-mail address" would fulfill all the truly > needed openness without giving away the specific contact point where > the subject holder can be harassed or attacked.
The problem of redaction is far more subtle than that. This is why the trans WG is looking for redaction use cases to be described and discussed on its list, so the full set of use cases can be considered when specifying a standardised redaction mechanism. - Matt _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
