On 17/11/2016 01:14, Matt Palmer wrote:
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 04:35:18PM +0100, Jakob Bohm wrote:
Redacted CT records that tell the world that "there is this single
certificate with this full TBS hash and these technical extensions
issued to some name domain/e-mail under example.com, but it is not
public which specific name/e-mail address" would fulfill all the truly
needed openness without giving away the specific contact point where
the subject holder can be harassed or attacked.
The problem of redaction is far more subtle than that. This is why the
trans WG is looking for redaction use cases to be described and discussed on
its list, so the full set of use cases can be considered when specifying a
standardised redaction mechanism.
Please expand on that and don't just point to a presumably huge
discussion list as containing an explanation of whatever "subtle
problem" you percieve.
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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