On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Ryan Hurst via dev-security-policy < firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > > There are some limitations relative to where this domain information is > used, for example > in the case of an EV certificate, if Google were to request Microsoft > use this capability the > EV badge would say verified by Google. This is because they display the > root name for the > EV badge. However, it is the subordinate CA in accordance with its CP/CPS > that is responsible > for vetting, as such the name displayed in this case should be GlobalSign. > > Despite these limitations, it may make sense in the case of Firefox to > maintain a similar capability.
Outside of EV, can you articulate why (preferably in a dedicated thread) There have been requests over the years from a variety of CAs for this. Each time, they've been rejected. If there's new information at hand, or a better understanding of the landscape since then, it would be good to articulate why, specifically for Mozilla products :) _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list email@example.com https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy