I took a stab at trying to grok this. I find I have more questions and a lot more concerns the more I read though. Please let me know if I'm not the only one having issues decoding the responses. Here's my first impressions:
RA & EV: Were all the certificates issued by the RAs uploaded to a CT log? If not, what, if any, subsets were uploaded? I'm aware Symantec was required to upload certificates to CT or if it was retroactive, but I'm unsure if that requirement was extended to the RAs. Furthermore, based on what I'm reading, at least one of these certificates should be in the logs since it took place post 01/01/15. Issue Y: A simple yes or no answer for the questions would have been nice here. What I'm reading and my understanding suggests that the subCA certificates could have technically issued a certificate trusted by Mozilla, but system controls prevented them from being used that way. How these system controls work is at best unclear. It's worth noting that the subCA "State of Florida AHCA Medium Assurance CA" and several other fPKI subCAs chaining off "VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2" are listed in crt.sh is listed as trusted in Mozilla in crt.sh (https://crt.sh/?caid=1384), and based on my understanding thus could theoretically issue certificates as there's no EKU. I can't find any leaf certificates issued by these CAs in crt.sh to confirm this fact though. Here's a question for Symantec, how are they aware of what certificates these sub-subCAs have or have not issued? I'm not sure if the green bar requires OIDs in all points along the certificate chain or if this Florida CA could have issued an leaf certificate by adding the OIDs there. Issue L: Given that the cross-signature was doing by VeriSign, I've got more questions. As far as I can tell, the response suggests that Symantec was aware that the cross-signature allowed the FPKI to be trusted in places it otherwise wouldn't be, and decided to ignore it until it expired out in 2016. That sounds bad, but my other possible reading of this was: "We were unaware of the cross-signature until 2014, and we let it expire in 2016 since we didn't know what it did". _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
