I think you're largely objecting to a strawman, no one is proposing
revoking trust in any of these threads.

The only CAs that have ever had _any_ penalty applied to them have been for
grotesque abuse of the trust vested in them.


On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 2:25 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> On 08/08/2017 18:43, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>> On Tuesday, August 8, 2017 at 11:05:06 PM UTC+9, Jakob Bohm wrote:
>>> I was not advocating "letting everyone decide".  I was advocating that
>>> Mozilla show some restraint, intelligence and common sense in wielding
>>> the new weapons that certlint and crt.sh have given us.
>>> This shouldn't be race as to who wields the weapon first, forgiving CAs
>>> only if they happen to report faster than some other newsgroup
>>> participant.
>>> This is similar to if a store boss gets a new surveillance camera in the
>>> shop and sees that some employees are taking extra breaks when there are
>>> few customers in the store.  It would be unreasonable for such a store
>>> boss to discipline this with similar zeal as seeing some employees
>>> genuinely steeling cash out of the register or selling stolen items out
>>> of the back door.  Instead the fact that they work less when there is
>>> less work to do should inspire reevaluation of any old rule that they
>>> are not allowed to have a watercooler chat during work hours.
>>> Now such a reevaluation might result in requiring them to use such
>>> occasions to clean the floors or do some other chores (Mozilla equiv:
>>> Deciding that the rule is important for good reason and needs to be
>>> followed in the future) or it could result in relaxing the rule as
>>> long as they stand ready the moment a customer arrives (Mozilla equiv:
>>> Relaxing the requirement, initially just for Mozilla, later perhaps as a
>>> BR change).
>>> Dogmatically insisting on enforcing rules that were previously not
>>> enforced due to lack of detection, just because "rules are rules" or
>>> other such arguments seems overzealous.
>> Such tools have been available for over a year. CAs have been aware of
>> this, the ability to run it over their own corpus and self-detect and
>> self-report. These tools, notably, were created by one of the newest CA
>> applicants - Amazon - based on a methodical study of what is required of a
>> CA.
>> Your attempts to characterize it as overzealous ignore this entirely. At
>> this point, it's gross negligence, and attempts to argue otherwise merely
>> suggest a lack of understanding or concern for standards compliance and
>> interoperability.
>> Mozilla has already communicated to CAs these tools exist and their
>> relevance to CAs.
>> Perhaps we can move on from misguided apologetics and instead focus on
>> how to make things better. Suggestions we ignore these, at this point, are
>> neither productive nor relevant. Attempts to suggest tortured metaphors are
>> like attempting to suggest rich people deserve to be robbed, or poor people
>> just need to work harder - arguments that are both hollow and borderline
>> offensive in their reductionism. A pattern of easily preventable
>> misissuance has been happening,CAs have been repeatedly told to
>> self-detect, and clearly, some CAs, like presumably some businesses, aren't
>> taking security seriously. That needs to stop.
> I am questioning the fairness of applying these tools, which did not
> exist when the rules were written, to enforce every rule with the same
> high weight.  I am not apologizing for bad behavior, I am saying if
> everybody gets scrutinized this hard, we will eventually have to
> distrust pretty much all the CAs, because there is no such thing as a
> perfect CA organization.
> So we need to prioritize the rules instead of just saying off-with-
> their-heads (revoke all affected certificates in 24 hours) whenever any
> formal rule was broken without actually harming security.
> An example of a graduated response:
> - Deliberately issued super-interception certificate: Instant revocation
>  of CA trust.
> - SubCA that does no vetting at all: Instant revocation and adding to
>  OneCRL.
> - Certificate issued to someone who should not have it (like the github
>  certs issued by WoSign): 24 hour revocation, faster if possible.
> - Certificate that violates rules and triggers a bug preventing Mozilla
>  NSS from detecting if it is revoked: 24 hour revocation and adding
>  special case code to NSS to treat this form of certificate as not valid
>  instead of non-revocable.
> - Certificate issued in such a way as to increase the risk of
>  post-issuance attacks (such as SHA-1 cert issued in 2016 or later with
>  insufficient random bits near the start of the TBSCertificate): 24 hour
>  revocation of cert itself, issuing SubCA revoked with 2 month delay to
>  replace affected good certificates from a new clean SubCA.
> - Single Certificate that violates rules, but works with revocation
>  checking in NSS and was issued to the proper party (possesses domains,
>  matches any real world identity in DN etc.): Revoke after 14 days, try
>  to replace before that.
> - Thousands of certificates that violate rules, but work with revocation
>  checking in NSS and were issued to the proper parties (example: O=
>  field replaced by "test" after full vetting of actual name): Revoke
>  after 2 months, try to replace before that.
> - Certificate that violates a previously unclear interpretation of a
>  rule, but works with revocation checking in NSS and was issued to the
>  proper party (example: 20 byte serial withe extra leading 0 byte, if
>  NSS revocation didn't fail on that): Clarify rule, but only revoke if
>  it has more than 9 months left before expiry.
> Comparison with some recent cases:
> Symantec's Korean RA replaced O with test (a minor thing, since no real
> organization was impersonated), but also failed to keep proper vetting
> records (a major thing, requiring urgent revocation).
> The interpretation of the 20 byte serial rule as being "160 arbitrary
> bits, sometimes encoded as a 23 byte DER structure (1 byte tag, 1 byte
> length, 1 leading 0, 20 significant bytes) would have been a lack of
> clarity and a future requirement, had it not been for the apparent fact
> (I haven't tested this) that NSS would be unable to detect revocation of
> such certs, but would accept them regardless of actual revocation, which
> escalates it to urgent revocation and a security bug filed against NSS
> to either block all such certs or implement revocation checking for
> them.
> Certificates issued with the IDNA in a SAN, but the equivalent unicode
> in CN: Falls in the 14 day bucket or perhaps the 9 month bucket
> (depending on clarity of old rules).  This is if NSS will only look
> at the SANs anyway when there is at least one SAN, as is required by
> once of the RFCs.  Ditto if NSS would not successfully match any network
> name to the UNICODE CN, because no pure ASCII string would compare equal
> to a string with at least one significant non-ASCII char.
> Enjoy
> Jakob
> --
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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