On 03/08/17 08:01, Olfa Kaddachi wrote:
> ==> Some of these controls are already in place (such as the field CN and 
> Subject Alternative Name that does not contain a private IP address). 

That doesn't quite answer my question.

Let me ask another way: for how long has the Government of Tunisia CA
been aware of the Baseline Requirements? From what date do you assert
that you have been compliant with these requirements?

> 4-    Validation of the technical data included in the CSR: The RA operator 
> checks :
> 
> Digital Signature Algorithm: SHA256
> Key Algorithm: RSA
> Key Size: 2048

Why can such things not be checked programmatically? It seems you are
opening yourselves up to the possibility of human error.

> Moreover, the NDCA is now implementing a new Managed PKI platform which will 
> be in production by the end of September 2017.  For the moment, the only 
> improvement done, is the printing of all the subject alternative names in the 
> certificate for the RA operators, in addition to the other fields (CN, O, OU, 
> mail) in such a way that they can visually check all the fields before the 
> delivery of the certificate.

A visual check may not catch every problem. For example, would it catch
a trailing space?

>>From what date would you say that your CA has been compliant with the CAB 
>>Forum Baseline Requirements? 
> ==> The TunRootCA2 and TunServerCA2 passed two successive external audit 
> performed by LSTI. The last audit took place from 27th to 30th September 2016 
> in applying the relevant ETSI Technical Specifications ETSI TS 102042v2.4.1. 

And that audit includes a BR audit?

Did the audit report have any qualifications?

Gerv
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