Hello, I started reading your CP/CPS and I noticed that you do not use the standard CA/B Forum terminology. Is this on purpose? Is it just a translation issue?
Furthermore, I believe that the English Root CA CP/CPS should be added to the bug, I can only find the translation of the SSL SubCA CP/CPS. And just a final note, I can't seem to be able to access the mail sent by Gerv the 15th of August (the one I'm replying to) at the google groups thread (https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/wCZsVq7AtUY). Maybe it got lost somehow and the CA contacts are using google groups to get an update on their discussion. Regards, Fotis On 15/08/2017 03:41 μμ, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 03/08/17 08:01, Olfa Kaddachi wrote: >> ==> Some of these controls are already in place (such as the field CN and >> Subject Alternative Name that does not contain a private IP address). > > That doesn't quite answer my question. > > Let me ask another way: for how long has the Government of Tunisia CA > been aware of the Baseline Requirements? From what date do you assert > that you have been compliant with these requirements? > >> 4- Validation of the technical data included in the CSR: The RA operator >> checks : >> >> Digital Signature Algorithm: SHA256 >> Key Algorithm: RSA >> Key Size: 2048 > > Why can such things not be checked programmatically? It seems you are > opening yourselves up to the possibility of human error. > >> Moreover, the NDCA is now implementing a new Managed PKI platform which will >> be in production by the end of September 2017. For the moment, the only >> improvement done, is the printing of all the subject alternative names in >> the certificate for the RA operators, in addition to the other fields (CN, >> O, OU, mail) in such a way that they can visually check all the fields >> before the delivery of the certificate. > > A visual check may not catch every problem. For example, would it catch > a trailing space? > >> >From what date would you say that your CA has been compliant with the CAB >> >Forum Baseline Requirements? >> ==> The TunRootCA2 and TunServerCA2 passed two successive external audit >> performed by LSTI. The last audit took place from 27th to 30th September >> 2016 in applying the relevant ETSI Technical Specifications ETSI TS >> 102042v2.4.1. > > And that audit includes a BR audit? > > Did the audit report have any qualifications? > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > firstname.lastname@example.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > -- Fotis Loukos, PhD Director of Security Architecture SSL Corp e: fot...@ssl.com w: https://www.ssl.com _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list email@example.com https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy