On Monday, 5 March 2018 15:44:20 UTC+1, Eric Mill wrote: > I think it probably makes more sense to focus on sensitive key material > than non-sensitive CSRs. > > As a starting point, how reasonable would it be for CAs to question their > resellers, or to disseminate additional language to add to their reseller > agreements to prohibit non-transactional/ephemeral key storage? > > -- > konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone>
I remember I read somewhere in the discussion about this incident that Trustico also may have taken normal CSR's from their customers and replaced them with CSR's they generated. Which would typically go unnoticed as they then after singing provided a file (pem or whatever) that could be put on the users webserver "without any further hassle". That is, they private key in that file would be the one Trustico used for that replacement CSR and not the one the customer provided. So, ehm... it worked. ;-) I do not know if that is truly what happend. But if it is, it would explain why some people on reddit persisted in saying their key could not have been compromised as they never gave it to Trustico at all, but they still got the notification E-Mail that their certificatie was about to be revoked. I don't know if it's worth investigating that angle any further, but it's perhaps a scenario worth considering in this context. For the reseller would strictly not be storing private keys of such subscribers. CU Hans _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
