On 18/03/2019 15:43, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 18/03/2019 15:30, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote: > <snip> >> On 14/03/2019 10:59, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote: >>> On 13/03/2019 22:28, Richard Moore via dev-security-policy wrote: >> <snip> >>>> If any other CA wants to check theirs before someone else does, then now >>>> is surely the time to speak up. >>> >>> Someone else is in the process of checking... ;-) >> >> The purpose of this survey is to flush out any further CAs that are (or >> have been) noncompliant with BR 7.1 but have not yet disclosed an >> incident.
The report now also includes issuing CAs whose certificates have not been disclosed to the CCADB, which of course is permitted for technically-constrained intermediates. (Many thanks to the person who pointed out this oversight to me). > Columns A and B are currently empty. They are intended to hold a > Bugzilla URL and the date on which the bug was filed. > > Jonathan Rudenberg has offered to review the disclosures that have been > posted by CAs so far (thanks Jonathan!), so I've given him edit rights > to the spreadsheet. Jonathan has finished filling in Columns A & B for all of the disclosures he's seen so far. >> Having scanned the crt.sh database, I have produced the following >> spreadsheet. It covers all certificates known to crt.sh where the >> notBefore date is between 30th September 2016(*) and 22nd February >> 2019(**), and where the issuing CA... >> - is currently trusted by Mozilla to issue serverAuthentication >> certificates, and >> - has issued at least 1 certificate with a <64-bit serial number. >> >> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1K96XkOFYaCIYOdUKokwTZfPWALWmDed7znjCFn6lKoc/edit?usp=sharing >> >> When a value in column E is 100%, this is pretty solid evidence of >> noncompliance with BR 7.1. >> When the values in column E and G are both approximately 50%, this >> suggests (but does not prove) that the CA is handling the output from >> their CSPRNG correctly. >> >> For some issuing CAs, the sample sizes are too small to be able to draw >> any conclusions. >> >> >> (*) This date was chosen because BR 7.1 says: >> "Effective September 30, 2016, CAs SHALL generate non-sequential >> Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 >> bits of output from a CSPRNG." >> >> (**) This is when Wayne started the discussion about DarkMatter, which >> is what prompted the discovery that many CAs were falling short of BR 7.1. > -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Sectigo Limited _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
