> On Oct 2, 2019, at 4:05 PM, Ronald Crane via dev-security-policy > <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > > On 10/2/2019 3:27 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: >> Ronald Crane via dev-security-policy <email@example.com> >> writes: >> >>> "Virtually impossible"? "Anyone"? Really? Those are big claims that need >>> real >>> data. >> How many references to research papers would you like? Would a dozen do, or >> do you want two dozen? > One well-done paper would do. >> I'm pretty sure I haven't been phished yet. >> How would you know? > > Since most phishing appears to be financial, I would expect unauthorized > withdrawals from financial accounts, unauthorized credit card charges, > unordered packages showing up, dunning notices from the IRS because I filed > my tax returns with a phisher, etc. I haven't observed these indicia of > getting phished.
[PW] I agree that financial is a good incentive. But it’s by no means the only incentive. According to Verizon, 93% of data breaches start with phishing - to steal credentials. Here’s what happens: Marriott Starwood Hotels, Aadhar, Exactis, MyFitnessPal and Quora were breached last year. Over 2 billion records were compromised. Most people changed their password on the site that was compromised. Most people use the same password for many services. Most people didn’t change their credentials on sites that weren’t compromised. Threat actor searches a one or more databases for a company or person and buys their credentials. Or just buys them in bulk. Threat actor tries the person’s credentials on internal systems or services with sensitive information. Another company is comprised. Loop. While the media talks about hacking and breaches and other cool “cyber” terms, what they’re not saying, is that social engineering is at the core of many of these attacks. Social engineering is cheaper, quicker and easier than trying to find computer or network based vulnerabilities. The latter does happen and there are many amazing security professionals building systems to detect and prevent those types of attacks. I’m not one of them because I’m not smart enough to address those weaknesses. > >> And how does this help the other 7.53 billion people who >> will be targets for phishers? > Alas it doesn't. We do need better phishing prevention. Do you have a > suggestion? [PW] While phishing detection and prevention is improving all the time, it will never be good enough. It’s much easier for a user to know that PayPal.com is who they think it is based on a visual indicator, than it is to detect the 14,000 PayPal phishing sites with a Let’s Encrypt DV certificate. Yes, I just went there :) - Paul >>> In any case, have we ever really tried to teach users to use the correct >>> domain? >> Yes, we've tried that. And that. And that too. And the other thing. Yes, >> that too. >> >> None of them work. > > Please cite the best study you know about on this topic (BTW, I am *not* > snidely implying that there isn't one). > > -R > > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > firstname.lastname@example.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list email@example.com https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy