On Wednesday, July 8, 2020 at 6:02:56 AM UTC+3, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > The question is simply whether or not user agents will accept the risk of > needing to remove the root suddenly, and with significant (e.g. active) > attack, or whether they would, as I suggest, take steps to remove the root > beforehand, to mitigate the risk. The cost of issuance plus the cost of > revocation are a fixed cost: it's either pay now or pay later. And it seems > like if one needs to contemplate revoking roots, it's better to do it > sooner, than wait for it to be an inconvenient or inopportune time. This is > why I meant earlier, when I said a solution that tries to wait until the > 'last possible minute' is just shifting the cost of misissuance onto > RPs/Browsers, by leaving them to clean up the mess. And a CA that tries to > shift costs onto the ecosystem like that seems like it's not a CA that can > be trusted to, well, be trustworthy.
This assumes that the private key of these intermediate CAs will inevitably get compromised. Why such an assumption? Following the same argument we can assume that the private key of any root CA will inevitably get compromised and suggest all CAs to revoke their roots already today. Does not seem to make sense. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
