Hi folks, 

there is consensus that some algorithms/ciphers (e.g. RC4) allowed by default 
should not be considered secure, though because of interop issues, they cannot 
be removed at this point. 

The problem with this is that people may think they are using a secure 
connection while in fact, someone could eavedrop. To reduce the impact of this 
problem, I propose to implement a visual indicator for when a connection should 
not be considered secure. The goal is not to show an OMG-BEWARE message but 
instead to not show a (falsy) "secure" indicator. 

Currently, there is a padlock shown for HTTPS connections in Firefox (see first 
part of [1]). For insecure (but encrypted connections), there are three 
options: 

A. Make it look like an HTTP connection: No padlock but the "world" icon, no 
"https:" string. 

B. Indicate a broken padlock (e.g. with a big fat red bar crossing the 
padlock), show the "https:" string (like in the second part of [2]).

C. Make it look like an HTTP connection but not lie about the protocol: Use the 
globe icon but show the "https:" string (like part 3 of [1]).


(A) is lying but mostly obvious, i.e. it says that the user is not on an 
encrypted connection and should act accordingly. (C) is non-obvious because the 
globe can mean anything and the "https:" may confuse / mislead people who are 
used to looking for this string. (B) may not be completely obvious but it shows 
that there is something wrong although you are on an encrypted connection - I 
prefer this last option. 


I understand that this is not dev.firefox but I think this is a solution that 
most can live with for the foreseeable future (this is no long-term solution!). 
Do you agree?

(The UI resolution can also be adopted for HTTP/2.0 unauthenticated HTTPS, and 
on any connection where the user bypassed any blocking mechanism, e.g. for 
failed cert checks. It may require changes to the identity panel as well to 
explain why the connection is shown as "unencrypted".)


Best regards,

Florian Bender


[1] http://imgur.com/C6wOlRm


Am Samstag, 14. Dezember 2013 07:48:01 UTC+1 schrieb marlen...@hushmail.com:
> I present a proposal to remove some vulnerable/deprecated/legacy TLS 
> ciphersuits from Firefox. I am not proposing addition of any new ciphersuits, 
> changing of priority order, protocol removal, or any other changes in 
> functionality.
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