On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 11:21 AM, Dirk-Willem van Gulik < di...@webweaving.org> wrote:
> On 25 Sep 2015, at 10:36, helpcrypto helpcrypto <helpcry...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > I hope you can find a solution for my problem, cause I can't. (And > perhaps it's impossible) > > > Based on my knowledge of PKCS#11 standard, the spec is exposed to a MITM > attack that steals the PIN when an application invokes C_Login against a > PK#11 library. > ... > > Sadly, using Pinpads is out of scope/beyond our possibilities. > > This won’t solve your problem directly - but may still be useful > (especially as I am guessing that as you are CC-ing the Mozilla list - that > you are concerned with browsers). > Indeed One way we got things this to pass munster was to carefully make a > threatmap/actor analysies - and then meet the various compliance & infosec > expectations was by 1) dispensing with the PIN and 2) having a `what you > know’ as part of the interaction through the browser (only). > Server-side signature won't be a problem, as security is left for the browser, but we are using cards, so the PIN has to reach the card, where the certificate is stored. > As this concerned access to something which was only accessible through > the browser - we essentially argued that if one where able to manipulate > the local browser/keyboard/system to such an extent as to be able to > capture the PIN near the PKCS library/driver - one would almost most > certainly be able to get `at’ whatever the chipcard & pin where protecting > `in’ the browser. > We are actually at that point. Browser is displaying a random number (kind of OTP) and application show it to let the user know the request is "trusted". But we still have the issue with the data sent from server. eg: server sent "sign these 10 documents" to our opensource Java local application which asks PKCS#11 to do it. Anyone could decompile, and inject an 11th doc on the request. That's what we are trying to avoid and our opinion is actually: if the computer is compromised, you can't do anything. Thanks for your answers -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
