On 19/08/19 01:00, Yao, Jiewen wrote: > in real world, we deprecate AB-seg usage because they are vulnerable > to smm cache poison attack. I assume cache poison is out of scope in > the virtual world, or there is a way to prevent ABseg cache poison.
Indeed the SMRR would not cover the A-seg on real hardware. However, if the chipset allowed aliasing A-seg SMRAM to 0x30000, it would only be used for SMBASE relocation of hotplugged CPU. The firmware would still keep low SMRAM disabled, *except around SMBASE relocation of hotplugged CPUs*. To avoid cache poisoning attacks, you only have to issue a WBINVD before enabling low SMRAM and before disabling it. Hotplug SMI is not a performance-sensitive path, so it's not a big deal. So I guess you agree that PCI DMA attacks are a potential vector also on real hardware. As Alex pointed out, VT-d is not a solution because there could be legitimate DMA happening during CPU hotplug. For OVMF we'll probably go with Igor's idea, it would be nice if Intel chipsets supported it too. :) Paolo -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#46043): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/46043 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/32852911/21656 Group Owner: devel+ow...@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [arch...@mail-archive.com] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
