Yes. I will try my best to merge. I checked the patch set but I did not find the "R-B" from UefiCpuPkg maintainer. Neither from email nor from you v11.
Did I miss something? Thank you Yao Jiewen > -----Original Message----- > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2021 12:13 PM > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m...@intel.com>; > Yao, Jiewen <jiewen....@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky > <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>; > Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianoc...@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas > <erdemak...@google.com>; Michael Roth <michael.r...@amd.com>; Gerd > Hoffmann <kra...@redhat.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > Subject: [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support > > Hi Gerd and Jiewen, > > CI was a bit unstable during my v10 submission, so, I was not able to > run it to the completion. Finally, I managed to get the CI going, > and it reported few Windows 32-bit build errors. The v11 fixes those build > errors. Please consider this for the merge. > > Thank you so much for all your support in reviewing the series. > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 > > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding > new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory > integrity > protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data > replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory > encryption environment. > > This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP > VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP > such as interrupt protection. > > Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new > structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP > VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the > guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to > guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE > instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request > NAE" > defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page > from the RMP table. > > Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated, > as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two > approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and > Lazy Validation. > > Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under > lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a > unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception > handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of > the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The > recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate > the > unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. > > At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the > available > system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated > before it is made available to the EDK2 core. > > Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP > guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the > SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted. > > Additional resources > --------------------- > SEV-SNP whitepaper > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm- > isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf > > APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36) > > The complete source is available at > https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/snp-v11 > > GHCB spec: > https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf > > SEV-SNP firmware specification: > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf > > Change since v10: > * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for > VS2017. > > Changes since v9: > * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg > * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary > until > we get lazy validation > > Changes since v8: > * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV. > > Changes since v7: > * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file > * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because > we were already in the MSR protocol mode. > * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate. > * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata. > > Change since v6: > * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided > structure > proposed by Min in TDX series. > * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the > reset > vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page. > * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset > vector > code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation. > * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which > memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it. > * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via > the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr. > * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c. > * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file. > > Change since v5: > * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page > * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c > * Rebase to the latest code > * Add the review feedback from Yao. > > Change since v4: > * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS > * Add VMPL-0 check > > Change since v3: > * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to > keep > the code readable. > * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state. > * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB > GPA. > * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the > AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it. > * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets. > > Changes since v2: > * Add support for the AP creation. > * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI > reads. > * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page. > * > Changes since v1: > * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region. > * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions. > * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is > supported. > * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from > MMIO ranges. > * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build. > * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location > through > EFI configuration table. > > Brijesh Singh (28): > OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c > UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use > OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page > OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() > OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 > OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI > phase > OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active > UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is > active > UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV > status > UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD > MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version > UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is > enabled > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map > OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration > table > > Michael Roth (3): > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values > OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values > UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check > > Tom Lendacky (1): > UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs > > MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 4 + > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 18 + > UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 5 + > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 8 +- > OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 4 + > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 9 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 6 + > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 7 + > .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 + > .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf | 2 + > OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf | 3 + > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 7 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 5 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 4 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 6 +- > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 6 +- > .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h | 25 + > MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +- > .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h | 33 ++ > OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 26 + > .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 36 ++ > .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 24 + > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h | 5 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h | 95 ++++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 93 ++++ > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 23 + > .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 + > .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 + > .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 ++ > .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++- > .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 127 +++++ > .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 82 ++++ > .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 294 ++++++++++++ > OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++-- > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 231 +++++++++ > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 2 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c | 298 ++++++++++++ > OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 158 +------ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c | 239 ++++++++++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 16 +- > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c | 70 +++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 345 +++++--------- > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c | 4 +- > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c | 261 ++++++++++ > OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 17 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm | 86 +++- > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 18 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm | 74 +++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 2 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm | 200 ++++++++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +--- > 59 files changed, 3329 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c > create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c > create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c > create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c > create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm > create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm > > -- > 2.25.1 -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this 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