I have not heard from UefiCpuPkg maintainers yet. Hopefully we get the Ack or R-b. Ray asked me to move the AmdSev in the common file which I did.
thanks On 10/23/21 8:46 PM, Yao, Jiewen via groups.io wrote: > Yes. I will try my best to merge. > > I checked the patch set but I did not find the "R-B" from UefiCpuPkg > maintainer. Neither from email nor from you v11. > > Did I miss something? > > Thank you > Yao Jiewen > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> >> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2021 12:13 PM >> To: devel@edk2.groups.io >> Cc: James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m...@intel.com>; >> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen....@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky >> <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>; >> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianoc...@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas >> <erdemak...@google.com>; Michael Roth <michael.r...@amd.com>; Gerd >> Hoffmann <kra...@redhat.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> >> Subject: [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support >> >> Hi Gerd and Jiewen, >> >> CI was a bit unstable during my v10 submission, so, I was not able to >> run it to the completion. Finally, I managed to get the CI going, >> and it reported few Windows 32-bit build errors. The v11 fixes those build >> errors. Please consider this for the merge. >> >> Thank you so much for all your support in reviewing the series. >> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> BZ: >> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=L41krO6G221HaIsG92FloIzgCDqMLAAsU26jaEMF7yw%3D&reserved=0 >> >> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding >> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory >> integrity >> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data >> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory >> encryption environment. >> >> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP >> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP >> such as interrupt protection. >> >> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new >> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP >> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the >> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to >> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE >> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request >> NAE" >> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page >> from the RMP table. >> >> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated, >> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two >> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and >> Lazy Validation. >> >> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under >> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a >> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception >> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of >> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The >> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate >> the >> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. >> >> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the >> available >> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated >> before it is made available to the EDK2 core. >> >> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP >> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the >> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted. >> >> Additional resources >> --------------------- >> SEV-SNP whitepaper >> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=nVMSG%2FvSS2Wa21lu1lGrHr9OYX8hL7FoAcQXBBiCztc%3D&reserved=0 >> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf >> >> APM 2: >> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=G8Xg2glOGY2EjHpeQ3WM4gZChuI0k8QcLDTbpJiTplg%3D&reserved=0 >> (section 15.36) >> >> The complete source is available at >> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp-v11&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=HMHFq8G%2FPqdhzNW3Ashmc4%2Bmv1RcDULD4vniofhiS54%3D&reserved=0 >> >> GHCB spec: >> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.amd.com%2Fwp-content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=YiPgZU87fdnl5rJpD0E2ue9aTKbqUwizuBrKxom0FiU%3D&reserved=0 >> >> SEV-SNP firmware specification: >> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F56860.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=bfQsY4%2BRnlFGuD3Bg%2BFPb3lRgSGgpomNocXswHqkm%2F4%3D&reserved=0 >> >> Change since v10: >> * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for >> VS2017. >> >> Changes since v9: >> * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg >> * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary >> until >> we get lazy validation >> >> Changes since v8: >> * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV. >> >> Changes since v7: >> * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file >> * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because >> we were already in the MSR protocol mode. >> * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate. >> * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata. >> >> Change since v6: >> * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided >> structure >> proposed by Min in TDX series. >> * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the >> reset >> vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page. >> * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset >> vector >> code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation. >> * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which >> memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it. >> * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via >> the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr. >> * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c. >> * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file. >> >> Change since v5: >> * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page >> * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c >> * Rebase to the latest code >> * Add the review feedback from Yao. >> >> Change since v4: >> * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS >> * Add VMPL-0 check >> >> Change since v3: >> * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to >> keep >> the code readable. >> * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state. >> * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB >> GPA. >> * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the >> AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it. >> * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets. >> >> Changes since v2: >> * Add support for the AP creation. >> * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI >> reads. >> * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page. >> * >> Changes since v1: >> * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region. >> * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions. >> * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is >> supported. >> * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from >> MMIO ranges. >> * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build. >> * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location >> through >> EFI configuration table. >> >> Brijesh Singh (28): >> OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use >> OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page >> OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() >> OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest >> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 >> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI >> phase >> OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active >> UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is >> active >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV >> status >> UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD >> MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version >> UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is >> enabled >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map >> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration >> table >> >> Michael Roth (3): >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values >> OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check >> >> Tom Lendacky (1): >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs >> >> MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 4 + >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 18 + >> UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 5 + >> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 8 +- >> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +- >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 4 + >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 9 +- >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +- >> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +- >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 6 + >> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 7 + >> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + >> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 + >> .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + >> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf | 2 + >> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf | 3 + >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 7 + >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 5 + >> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 4 + >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 6 +- >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 6 +- >> .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h | 25 + >> MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +- >> .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h | 33 ++ >> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 26 + >> .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 36 ++ >> .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 24 + >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h | 5 + >> OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h | 95 ++++ >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 93 ++++ >> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 23 + >> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ >> .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 + >> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ >> .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 + >> .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 ++ >> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++- >> .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 127 +++++ >> .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 82 ++++ >> .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 294 ++++++++++++ >> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++-- >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 231 +++++++++ >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 2 + >> OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c | 298 ++++++++++++ >> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 158 +------ >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c | 239 ++++++++++ >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 16 +- >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c | 70 +++ >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 345 +++++--------- >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c | 4 +- >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c | 261 ++++++++++ >> OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 + >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 17 + >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm | 86 +++- >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 18 + >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm | 74 +++ >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 2 + >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm | 200 ++++++++ >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +--- >> 59 files changed, 3329 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-) >> create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h >> create mode 100644 >> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h >> create mode 100644 >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h >> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h >> create mode 100644 >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c >> create mode 100644 >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c >> create mode 100644 >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c >> create mode 100644 >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c >> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c >> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm >> >> -- >> 2.25.1 > > > > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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