Hi Brijesh Have you got R-B from UefiCpuPkg maintainer?
> -----Original Message----- > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > Sent: Monday, October 25, 2021 7:54 AM > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen....@intel.com> > Cc: brijesh.si...@amd.com; James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M > <min.m...@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>; Justen, > Jordan L <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>; Ard Biesheuvel > <ardb+tianoc...@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas <erdemak...@google.com>; > Michael Roth <michael.r...@amd.com>; Gerd Hoffmann <kra...@redhat.com> > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging > (SEV-SNP) support > > Thank Jiewen, > > I have ping'ed UefiCpuPkg maintainer (Ray and Rahul) on every patch > which touches the UefiCpuPkg. If maintainer wants me to rework on > something then I will work accordingly. If they are okay with v11 then > now the merge will create a conflict (due to the TDX patches merge > commit). I have rebased my series to the recent master and have pushed > it here: https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/snp-v12. I can post the > series if you prefer it. > > thanks > > On 10/23/21 8:46 PM, Yao, Jiewen via groups.io wrote: > > Yes. I will try my best to merge. > > > > I checked the patch set but I did not find the "R-B" from UefiCpuPkg > maintainer. Neither from email nor from you v11. > > > > Did I miss something? > > > > Thank you > > Yao Jiewen > > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > >> Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2021 12:13 PM > >> To: devel@edk2.groups.io > >> Cc: James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M > <min.m...@intel.com>; > >> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen....@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky > >> <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>; > >> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianoc...@kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas > >> <erdemak...@google.com>; Michael Roth <michael.r...@amd.com>; Gerd > >> Hoffmann <kra...@redhat.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > >> Subject: [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) > support > >> > >> Hi Gerd and Jiewen, > >> > >> CI was a bit unstable during my v10 submission, so, I was not able to > >> run it to the completion. Finally, I managed to get the CI going, > >> and it reported few Windows 32-bit build errors. The v11 fixes those build > >> errors. Please consider this for the merge. > >> > >> Thank you so much for all your support in reviewing the series. > >> > >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> BZ: > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla. > tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh. > singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe488 > 4e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7 > CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ > XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=L41krO6G221HaIsG92FloIzgCDqMLAAsU26 > jaEMF7yw%3D&reserved=0 > >> > >> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding > >> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory > >> integrity > >> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data > >> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory > >> encryption environment. > >> > >> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the > >> SEV-SNP > >> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV- > SNP > >> such as interrupt protection. > >> > >> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new > >> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP > >> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the > >> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to > >> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE > >> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request > >> NAE" > >> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page > >> from the RMP table. > >> > >> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or > >> unvalidated, > >> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two > >> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and > >> Lazy Validation. > >> > >> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under > >> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a > >> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception > >> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of > >> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The > >> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate > >> the > >> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. > >> > >> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the > available > >> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is > validated > >> before it is made available to the EDK2 core. > >> > >> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP > >> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the > >> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted. > >> > >> Additional resources > >> --------------------- > >> SEV-SNP whitepaper > >> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a > md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm- > &data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da > 08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C63770 > 6369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQ > IjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=nVMSG% > 2FvSS2Wa21lu1lGrHr9OYX8hL7FoAcQXBBiCztc%3D&reserved=0 > >> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf > >> > >> APM 2: > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a > md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&data=04%7C01%7 > Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8 > 961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnk > nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h > aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=G8Xg2glOGY2EjHpeQ3WM4gZCh > uI0k8QcLDTbpJiTplg%3D&reserved=0 (section 15.36) > >> > >> The complete source is available at > >> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.c > om%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsnp- > v11&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d > 0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C63 > 7706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiL > CJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=HMH > Fq8G%2FPqdhzNW3Ashmc4%2Bmv1RcDULD4vniofhiS54%3D&reserved=0 > >> > >> GHCB spec: > >> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdevelop > er.amd.com%2Fwp- > content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40a > md.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11 > a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ > sb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0 > %3D%7C3000&sdata=YiPgZU87fdnl5rJpD0E2ue9aTKbqUwizuBrKxom0FiU% > 3D&reserved=0 > >> > >> SEV-SNP firmware specification: > >> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.a > md.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F56860.pdf&data=04%7C01%7 > Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cddc5570780ff4a91d0da08d9969026e2%7C3dd8 > 961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637706369230826414%7CUnk > nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h > aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=bfQsY4%2BRnlFGuD3Bg%2BFPb3l > RgSGgpomNocXswHqkm%2F4%3D&reserved=0 > >> > >> Change since v10: > >> * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 > >> for > >> VS2017. > >> > >> Changes since v9: > >> * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg > >> * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary > until > >> we get lazy validation > >> > >> Changes since v8: > >> * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV. > >> > >> Changes since v7: > >> * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file > >> * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because > >> we were already in the MSR protocol mode. > >> * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate. > >> * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata. > >> > >> Change since v6: > >> * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided > >> structure > >> proposed by Min in TDX series. > >> * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the > reset > >> vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page. > >> * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset > >> vector > >> code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation. > >> * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which > >> memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it. > >> * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via > >> the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr. > >> * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c. > >> * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file. > >> > >> Change since v5: > >> * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page > >> * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c > >> * Rebase to the latest code > >> * Add the review feedback from Yao. > >> > >> Change since v4: > >> * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS > >> * Add VMPL-0 check > >> > >> Change since v3: > >> * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to > >> keep > >> the code readable. > >> * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state. > >> * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB > GPA. > >> * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the > >> AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it. > >> * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets. > >> > >> Changes since v2: > >> * Add support for the AP creation. > >> * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for > PCI > >> reads. > >> * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page. > >> * > >> Changes since v1: > >> * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap > >> region. > >> * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions. > >> * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature > >> is > >> supported. > >> * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit > from > >> MMIO ranges. > >> * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build. > >> * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location > >> through > >> EFI configuration table. > >> > >> Brijesh Singh (28): > >> OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c > >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use > >> OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page > >> OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase > >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() > >> OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > >> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space > >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM > >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 > >> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM > >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI > >> phase > >> OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active > >> UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is > >> active > >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV > >> status > >> UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD > >> MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version > >> UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is > >> enabled > >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table > >> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map > >> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration > >> table > >> > >> Michael Roth (3): > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values > >> OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values > >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check > >> > >> Tom Lendacky (1): > >> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs > >> > >> MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 4 + > >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 18 + > >> UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 5 + > >> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 8 +- > >> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +- > >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 4 + > >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 9 +- > >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +- > >> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +- > >> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 6 + > >> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 7 + > >> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > >> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 + > >> .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > >> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf | 2 + > >> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf | 3 + > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 7 + > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 5 + > >> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 4 + > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 6 +- > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 6 +- > >> .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h | 25 + > >> MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +- > >> .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h | 33 ++ > >> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 26 + > >> .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 36 ++ > >> .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 24 + > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h | 5 + > >> OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h | 95 ++++ > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 93 ++++ > >> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 23 + > >> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > >> .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 + > >> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > >> .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 + > >> .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 ++ > >> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++- > >> .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 127 +++++ > >> .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 82 ++++ > >> .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 294 ++++++++++++ > >> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 > ++++++++++++++++-- > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 231 +++++++++ > >> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 2 + > >> OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c | 298 ++++++++++++ > >> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 158 +------ > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c | 239 ++++++++++ > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 16 +- > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c | 70 +++ > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 345 +++++--------- > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c | 4 +- > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c | 261 ++++++++++ > >> OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 + > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 17 + > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm | 86 +++- > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 18 + > >> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm | 74 +++ > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 2 + > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm | 200 ++++++++ > >> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +--- > >> 59 files changed, 3329 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-) > >> create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h > >> create mode 100644 > >> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h > >> create mode 100644 > >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h > >> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h > >> create mode 100644 > >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c > >> create mode 100644 > >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c > >> create mode 100644 > >> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c > >> create mode 100644 > >> > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c > >> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c > >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c > >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c > >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c > >> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm > >> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm > >> > >> -- > >> 2.25.1 > > > > > > > > > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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