On Thu, Oct 16, 2003 at 06:03:45AM -0700, Martin Stone Davis wrote: > Martin Stone Davis wrote: > > > >> Some Guy wrote: > >> --- Martin Stone Davis > >><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: <big snip> > >> > >>>I'm having a lot of trouble coming up with a good solution. Thoughts? > >> > >>Here are some: > >> > <snip> > >>4) Inserter/requestor anonymity can be improved with another layer of > >>onion style routing. For > >>example I pick n nodes, I build a chain up only talking to the first > >>one. Each node gets a > >>symetric key and the last node acts as my proxy for insertion an > >>deletion. In order for them to > >>link it to me all n nodes have to be compromised. > >> > >>You can improve this buy making a few of these chains and using each > >>one for a particular peice of > >>hashspace and connecting them to nodes which might be specailized in > >>the area (or let them become > >>so). > >> > >>I believe Toad mentioned doing this for maybe just two hops or so. > >> > >Yes, that would certainly strengthen inserter/requestor anonymity at the > >time of insertion/requesting, but doesn't it still allow for probing the > >DS? > > However, that gives me an idea: Node C would have a much harder > mounting a timing attack on A if he had to go through some node D (who > is chosen by A) in order to do it. > > Could we somehow require all nodes making a query of us to prove that > the query had previously been routed through at least one other node > chosen by us? Actually, such a requirement is too stringent.
Interesting... > > SOLUTION #3: Instead, say E queries D queries C queries B queries A. > Even though B doesn't know about D, he is (somehow) able to prove to A > that D is further up in the chain. (Let's leave how that all is > possible for further discussion. I'm just trying to work out the basic > idea here.) > > Now, A can decide whether to REALLY trust B (in which case he checks his > datastore for the key and replies if he has it, or if he doesn't have > it, he routes as usual to another node) or NOT trust B (in which case he > simply routes to another node). His decision on whether to trust B is > based on A's knowledge of B and D. If B and D had routed through each > other too many times in the past, then A will suspect B and D of being > in cahoots (like B and C of my AAIR hypothetical). However, if A sees > that B hasn't had much experience with D, then A will trust B. Or he could fake the timing if he doesn't trust B. Hrrm. I'm not sure how this would work in practice... please keep looking at it, maybe there is something here. > > I'm sure the idea could be further improved/optimized, but if such a > thing is possible, it may be the solution to timing attacks. > > -Martin > > P.S. Fish, I'll read your comments now. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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