On Tue, Oct 28, 2003 at 01:15:04PM +0100, Some Guy wrote: > --- Toad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 27, 2003 at 01:18:14PM +0100, Some Guy wrote: > > > --- Martin Stone Davis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > In any case, I think this thread is complete... Toad's premix routing > > > > solution (when he's able to get to it) will solve the anonymity problems > > > > I raised. > > > > > > Don't want to reil anyone up but...... > > > > > > Long term if we implement something like premix routing, we could change the > > > underlieing > > network > > > to some more efficient DHT as long as it was secure against DSA and other > > > censorship attacks > > > dirrected at the data. > > > > Yeah, right. It would be as vulnerable to attack as are all DHT based > > systems. It would not adapt to changing usage patterns or losing nodes, > > it would reduce anonymity and it would generally be a bad thing. And it > > is going in over my, and ian's, afaict, dead bodies. > > I thought I made it clear in my reply to Ian that I don't mean the academic DHTs. I > just mean we > can do things to improve resistance to DoS and cancer nodes and performance, without > having to > worry about objections of "wait that screws up anonymity!!!".
Yeah, it changes the game slightly. Just slightly afaics, but maybe more than that. I doubt we'll see any radical changes to routing/caching though. > > > > In the end we'd probably wind up with a two layer network dividing and > > > conquering the problem. > > > > > One layer would take care of requestor/poster annonymity, and the other would > > > take care of > > safe > > > storage. > > > > > > I see two nice ways they could interact: > > > 1) If I build several annoymous tunnels I can send data to the most appropriate > > > end node to > > > improve routing costs some. > > > 2) The DHT's traffic and topology should provide great cover against several > > > atacks on the > > > anonoymizing layer. > > > > > > I know this is all very long term, but if we've resigned ourselves to implement > > > some premix > > > solution, it seems logical to keep this idea in the back of our heads. > > > > No. Premix routing would be used exclusively on client requests. Not for > > other requests. Because we don't want to slow down the system even more. > > Right, I was never suggesting the DHT-like network use the premix routing. I am > suggesting they > use the same topology/connections because that will create tons of cover traffic. Ok. That's the intention. Interpretting "DHT-like" loosely. > > > And if you want to implement a general purpose TCP anonymization system, > > go right ahead. But it'll be very difficult. However, you could > > certainly run a DHT on top of it. > > That link I have you a while back: > http://www.pdos.lcs.mit.edu/tarzan/overview.html > If you read thier latest paper, it's interesting how related the two problems are. > They have too > have to create a topology that keeps cancer nodes from encircling a target, so they > have to make > sure nodes are randomly distributed throughout their net. Sound familiar? > > If they find nice ways to create random graphs for premix routing, we can use those > channels for > freenet routing, and the two would both benifit. Hmm. Interesting. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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