On Saturday 01 November 2003 06:19 pm, pineapple wrote:
> Uh oh! I have another idea for this! Another
> weakness with this attack is the assumption that is
> made about what constitutes a nearby key. Right now
> all nodes arrange their estimator keyspace internally
> in the same manner. Why? The keys are encrypted so
> they are essentially random and therefore they have no
> relationship to each other based on their content. My
> proposal is to randomly scramble the estimator
> keyspace using a function with a 1:1 mapping between
> the normal ordering and the new ordering scheme (I
> have no idea what function would be best for this).
> Now an attacker has no idea what key would be "near"
> the target key because every node would have it's own
> secret ordering for the estimator keyspace. Two keys
> may be near each other on one node but very far apart
> on another. Please keep in mind I'm talking about the
> estimator keyspace only.
Maybe just XOR with a randomly chosen node-private value. But won't this fubar
routing and specialization, if each node has a different ordering in its
routing? Or do I misunderstand what is meant by "estimator keyspace"?
--
"I love deadlines. I love the whooshing sound they make as they go by."
- Douglas Adams
Nick Tarleton - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - PGP key available
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