On Sat, Nov 01, 2003 at 03:19:43PM -0800, pineapple wrote: > Uh oh! I have another idea for this! Another > weakness with this attack is the assumption that is > made about what constitutes a nearby key. Right now > all nodes arrange their estimator keyspace internally > in the same manner. Why? The keys are encrypted so > they are essentially random and therefore they have no > relationship to each other based on their content. My > proposal is to randomly scramble the estimator > keyspace using a function with a 1:1 mapping between > the normal ordering and the new ordering scheme (I > have no idea what function would be best for this). > Now an attacker has no idea what key would be "near" > the target key because every node would have it's own > secret ordering for the estimator keyspace. Two keys > may be near each other on one node but very far apart > on another. Please keep in mind I'm talking about the > estimator keyspace only.
This destroys any chance of Freenet routing working. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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