Matthew Toseland wrote: > If you route randomly on each hop I'd > expect to on average not get very far, because *most links are short links* > on a small-world network.
Yup, it's counter-intuitive because of clustering but small world networks do have fast mixing times, ie short random walks will quickly take you out of your local neighbourhood. > On the other hand if you choose a random location > and consistently route towards it you should have an equal chance of ending > up anywhere on the network. Almost equal - the probability of ending up at a node is proportional to the amount of keyspace it controls, which is somewhat unevenly distributed even in an ideal network. > The catch is that if you route lots of requests > to different random locations, and the attacker can connect the requests, he > can gradually narrow down the locations you could have started in. True, and Borisov doesn't address this problem (which IMO is a major one). As you know, my proposed solution is to reuse the same random path for as long as possible (tunnels). > On a cell of 10,000 nodes, if on > average each node goes down once a day, and this impacts on 10 other nodes, > we have ~ 100,000 messages ... perhaps hundreds of megabytes, so it may be > that cells this big are feasible. There's a tradeoff here: large cells provide a large anonymity set if the attacker's outside the cell, but they make it more likely that there's an attacker inside the cell who can attack key distribution etc. Cheers, Michael _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [email protected] http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
