BTW in my second post which you haven't replied to yet I didn't make a clear distinction between files as CHK's of say 1 meg of apparently random data vs files (documents) as content (not random).
On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 14:31, Mark J Roberts wrote: > > If the police don't know which of the set of constituent parts were > inserted in the act of publishing the illegal file, I'll admit it > gets more interesting. They might very well suppress them all. This can't be done by police. It would require a very large concerted action against all of the freenet nodes at once, and would require court orders etc. > > > Besides, I don't mind reinserting my file. The whole point > > of this is to make enforcement of copyright absurd and > > infeasible, not to make my file accessible. > > I don't understand. Entanglements are a doomsday device. Nuke any > single document and, ideally, they all die. Not at all. This is a data compression scheme which avoids the problem of incompressibility. Any 1 meg file can be represented as a CHK. (It fails only when there are hash collisions.) A document (that is, content) is broken up into say 1 meg chunks (or whatever size splitfiles use). For each chunk of the file, I obtain 1 meg of high quality random bytes. I also obtain one or more randomly selected CHK's of 1 meg each. Then I calculate a new 1 meg chunk from the random bytes, the document fragment, and the CHK's, using XOR's. Some CHK's I encrypt (with a symmetric key) and reinsert. This creates redundancy for any documents which already use those CHK's since I can later release a revised formula for those documents (without even knowing what the document is, since I just look for formulas which reference the old CHK and substitute the new CHK plus the encryption key). Thus, all freenet nodes are continually requesting randomly selected CHK's and are continually inserting new ones. No one can tell which traffic is random and which is directed at inserting or obtaining some document. The nodes are also exchanging formulas all the time. These circulate among all of the nodes, in a traffic analysis resistant fashion. The copyright "owner" can run his own node and whenever he finds a formula to his content, he can demand that the formula be suppressed under the DMCA. But it's too late: by now the nodes which are looking for his content have obtained it, and also, by now there is another version of the formula which he doesn't know yet so he can't ask to suppress it. > > The problem is that there will be attackers who do not care, so it > won't make attacks infeasible. They have to take the whole network down, and erase all of the disks to be sure of getting rid of one document. -- Ed Huff _______________________________________________ devl mailing list devl at freenetproject.org http://hawk.freenetproject.org:8080/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
