Edward J. Huff: > Not at all. This is a data compression scheme which avoids > the problem of incompressibility. Any 1 meg file can be > represented as a CHK. (It fails only when there are hash > collisions.)
I don't understand how this relates to compression. It doubles the size of all downloads, and the storage required for a given file does not change. > Thus, all freenet nodes are continually requesting > randomly selected CHK's and are continually inserting > new ones. No one can tell which traffic is random > and which is directed at inserting or obtaining > some document. This is nice, but I suspect that it will not make real-world traffic analysis much more difficult. > The nodes are also exchanging formulas all the time. > These circulate among all of the nodes, in a traffic > analysis resistant fashion. The copyright "owner" > can run his own node and whenever he finds a formula > to his content, he can demand that the formula be > suppressed under the DMCA. But it's too late: by > now the nodes which are looking for his content have > obtained it, and also, by now there is another version > of the formula which he doesn't know yet so he can't > ask to suppress it. How do I trust the legitimacy of a given formula? What prevents an attacker from advertising tons of false formulas for a file? > They have to take the whole network down, and erase > all of the disks to be sure of getting rid of one > document. One can never be sure, I'll agree, but they can destroy the CHKs indicated by the redundant formulas as quickly as they get them. _______________________________________________ devl mailing list devl at freenetproject.org http://hawk.freenetproject.org:8080/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
