On Sun, May 04, 2003 at 08:09:14AM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote: > [If freenet-tech were "post only by members", I would gladly > move this discussion there. But I argue that it is relevant > here, because if my theory is correct, the routing layer of > Freenet only needs to concern itself with efficiently moving > fixed length random files around. The current implementation > does that ok, but if some constraints were lifted, it could > do better. All of my stuff is done at the application layer. > It could even be done by a completely separate network of nodes > which communicate only about formulas, and which occasionally > insert files into freenet.] > > On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 17:49, Mark J Roberts wrote: > > I don't understand how this relates to compression. It doubles the > > size of all downloads, and the storage required for a given file > > does not change. > > This is a _legal_ theory, which as we all know, has nothing > to do with the real world. _Legally_, the information becomes > compressed, not _actually_. The goal of this legal compression > is to make obvious the absurdity of the concept of IP. As > Professor Eben Moglen remarks, "[the] intellectual property system > [is] a tripartite oxymoron like Voltaire's Holy Roman Empire." > > http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/nospeech.html > > In another paper, "Anarchism triumphant: Free Software and > the Death of Copyright," > > http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/anarchism.html, > > Moglen points out exactly what my "legal" compression is > intended to make obvious: the law must treat some numbers > differently than others, and this is absurd. By linking > many different documents to the same random numbers, I > expose the contradiction in the law, because the law now > needs to treat the _same_ number in several different ways. > It can't do that, and so the fixed length random files in > Freenet cannot be interdicted. Only the tiny formulas for > reconstructing huge documents from those fixed length files > can be interdicted, and we need to design a system so that > the law ends up tripping all over itself in attempting to > enforce this interdiction. > > > > > > Thus, all freenet nodes are continually requesting > > > randomly selected CHK's and are continually inserting > > > new ones. No one can tell which traffic is random > > > and which is directed at inserting or obtaining > > > some document. > > > > This is nice, but I suspect that it will not make real-world > > traffic analysis much more difficult. > > You might be right. More detailed analysis would be > necessary to see. But I don't care. My goal is not > to make the world safe for child porn. It is to make > the absurdity of copyright obvious, so that enforcement > of copyright becomes ridiculous, and so that civil > disobedience on a wide scale becomes feasible. > > > > > > [...] > > > > How do I trust the legitimacy of a given formula? What prevents an > > attacker from advertising tons of false formulas for a file? > > Because he gets a bad reputation, and everyone starts ignoring him. > You can't lie without getting found out. A false formula involves > stating that CHK b was created from CHK a by encryption with a > specific key. The lie is easily found out. The occasional key > collision would look the same as a lie, but the statistics would > be different (happens to everyone about the same number of times).
Only if identity has a nonzero cost. Good luck implementing anonymous web of trust... fesible but probably difficult... > > There is no difficulty in revealing which node did the encryption, > because at the time the node made the calculation, it had not been > notified of any legal duty to refuse to deal with CHK a. Eh? > > > > They have to take the whole network down, and erase > > > all of the disks to be sure of getting rid of one > > > document. > > > > One can never be sure, I'll agree, but they can destroy the CHKs > > indicated by the redundant formulas as quickly as they get them. > > You don't reveal the new formulas until after a delay > so that it is likely that the new CHKs have been used in > several new formulas. In fact, you don't reveal the _first_ > formula for a given document until after there are many different > formulas available. > > -- Ed Huff _______________________________________________ devl mailing list devl at freenetproject.org http://hawk.freenetproject.org:8080/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
