On Sat, May 03, 2003 at 03:29:17PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote: > BTW in my second post which you haven't replied to yet I didn't > make a clear distinction between files as CHK's of say 1 meg of > apparently random data vs files (documents) as content (not random). > > On Sat, 2003-05-03 at 14:31, Mark J Roberts wrote: > > > > If the police don't know which of the set of constituent parts were > > inserted in the act of publishing the illegal file, I'll admit it > > gets more interesting. They might very well suppress them all. > > This can't be done by police. It would require a very large > concerted action against all of the freenet nodes at once, > and would require court orders etc.
They would need court orders, or some form of threats, anyway, to perform the attack you are trying to work around (censoring a key). > > > > > > Besides, I don't mind reinserting my file. The whole point > > > of this is to make enforcement of copyright absurd and > > > infeasible, not to make my file accessible. > > > > I don't understand. Entanglements are a doomsday device. Nuke any > > single document and, ideally, they all die. > > Not at all. This is a data compression scheme which avoids > the problem of incompressibility. Any 1 meg file can be > represented as a CHK. (It fails only when there are hash > collisions.) > > A document (that is, content) is broken up into say 1 meg chunks > (or whatever size splitfiles use). For each chunk of the > file, I obtain 1 meg of high quality random bytes. I also > obtain one or more randomly selected CHK's of 1 meg each. > Then I calculate a new 1 meg chunk from the random bytes, > the document fragment, and the CHK's, using XOR's. > > Some CHK's I encrypt (with a symmetric key) and reinsert. > This creates redundancy for any documents which already > use those CHK's since I can later release a revised > formula for those documents (without even knowing what > the document is, since I just look for formulas which > reference the old CHK and substitute the new CHK plus > the encryption key). > > Thus, all freenet nodes are continually requesting > randomly selected CHK's and are continually inserting > new ones. No one can tell which traffic is random > and which is directed at inserting or obtaining > some document. > > The nodes are also exchanging formulas all the time. > These circulate among all of the nodes, in a traffic > analysis resistant fashion. The copyright "owner" > can run his own node and whenever he finds a formula > to his content, he can demand that the formula be > suppressed under the DMCA. But it's too late: by > now the nodes which are looking for his content have > obtained it, and also, by now there is another version > of the formula which he doesn't know yet so he can't > ask to suppress it. I still do not understand the "exchanging formulas" thingy. > > > > > The problem is that there will be attackers who do not care, so it > > won't make attacks infeasible. > > They have to take the whole network down, and erase > all of the disks to be sure of getting rid of one > document. > > -- Ed Huff > _______________________________________________ devl mailing list devl at freenetproject.org http://hawk.freenetproject.org:8080/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
